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STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS ON 
WRONGFUL BIRTH CLAIMS & THEIR 
DANGEROUS EFFECTS ON PARENTS 
CAILIN HARRIS* 
Abstract: Wrongful birth claims are negligence actions brought on behalf of 
children born with disabilities or genetic disorders that were not properly diag-
nosed before the child’s birth. The plaintiffs, typically the parents of the afflicted 
child, argue that without the defendant’s negligence, the parents would have had 
the opportunity to prevent the child’s birth and subsequent condition by choosing 
to terminate the pregnancy. A number of states have responded to the growing 
prevalence of wrongful birth claims by enacting legislation that bars plaintiffs 
from bringing wrongful birth actions. These statutes, however, pose a threat to 
the parental rights of disabled or terminally ill children, as they diminish abortion 
rights and bar parents from recovering the enormous medical and emotional 
damages of giving birth to the afflicted child. States should not prohibit this 
cause of action and, instead, the merits of these claims should be decided through 
the court system. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 4, 1997, Milda Geler and Edward Faynin, a married couple from 
New Jersey, gave birth to a baby girl named Shannon.1 Shannon was healthy 
and developed normally for the first few months of her life.2 When she was 
five months old, however, Shannon began to develop progressive neurological 
deficits and was eventually diagnosed with Tay-Sachs disease.3 As a result of 
the disease, Shannon’s condition rapidly worsened, she suffered frequent sei-
zures, and she eventually became blind, deaf, and paralyzed.4 Shannon died 
just before her second birthday.5 
                                                                                                                           
 * Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2013–2014. 
 1 Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. at 407–08 (“Tay-Sachs disease is a genetically-inherited, incurable condition that first ap-
pears in an infant at approximately six months of age, progressively causing mental retardation, blind-
ness, seizures, and death between the ages of two and four years.”). 
 4 Id. at 408–09. 
 5 See id. 
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Throughout her pregnancy with Shannon, Milda Geler met regularly with 
her obstetricians, Dr. Richard Akawie and Dr. Michael Weingarten.6 As early 
as the eleventh week of Geler’s pregnancy, Dr. Akawie recognized that Geler 
and Faynin were at high risk of having a child with Tay-Sachs disease.7 De-
spite this realization, neither doctor ensured that they conducted the genetic 
testing that could have diagnosed Shannon’s condition.8 
Sadly, Shannon’s illness and suffering caused significant strain on Geler 
and Faynin’s relationship and the couple divorced soon after their daughter 
died.9 Additionally, both Geler and Faynin continue to suffer from emotional 
distress and Faynin occasionally abuses alcohol as a result of his grief over his 
daughter’s death.10 
Shannon’s parents believed that their daughter’s suffering and their own 
hardship in caring for Shannon and witnessing her tragic deterioration could 
have been prevented.11 After Shannon’s death, Geler and Faynin sued Drs. 
Akawie and Weingarten for wrongful birth, alleging that the doctors failed to 
diagnose Shannon’s condition while Geler was pregnant.12 In order to recover 
damages, parents who sue for wrongful birth must show that the defendant 
deprived them of the opportunity to choose to terminate their pregnancy.13 Ge-
ler and Faynin contended that had they known that Shannon would suffer so 
extensively and die within two years of her birth, they would have terminated 
the pregnancy.14 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See id. at 407–08. 
 7 See id. at 408. Dr. Akawie noted that Geler and Faynin could both be carriers of the Tay-Sachs 
gene because both parents were Ashkenazi Jews. Id. at 407. Tay-Sachs disease is very common in 
Ashkenazi Jewish families, affecting approximately one out of 3600 conceptions. Id. When both par-
ents are carriers of the Tay-Sachs gene, there is a one in four chance that their child will have the 
disease. Id. 
 8 See id. at 408. Testing for Tay-Sachs disease in a fetus is typically performed by first identifying 
the prospective parents as carriers for the Tay-Sachs gene through a simple serum analysis blood test. 
See id. at 407. If both parents are found to be carriers, then amniocentesis, which tests amniotic fluid 
for a number of conditions, is performed on the fetus to confirm the diagnosis. Id.; see Smith v. Cote, 
513 A.2d 341, 346 (N.H. 1986). 
 9 Geler, 818 A.2d at 409. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See id. 
 12 Id. at 406. 
 13 See Sernovitz v. Dershaw, 57 A.3d 1254, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Geler, 818 A.2d at 406; 
Kathy Lohr, Should Parents Be Able to Sue for ‘Wrongful Birth’?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 15, 
2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/05/15/152687638/should-parents-be-able-to-sue-for-
wrongful-birth. In the article, Kari Ann Rinker of the Kansas chapter of the National Organization for 
Women is quoted as saying, “No one wants to state out loud, ‘I would have chosen to abort my child,’ 
but this is often the only way for a parent to seek legal recourse.” Lohr, supra. 
 14 See Geler, 818 A.2d at 409. 
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Wrongful birth claims have become increasingly common, and are a val-
uable way of allowing parents to recover for the medical expenses and emo-
tional suffering that result from giving birth to an unhealthy child after failed 
genetic or prenatal testing.15 Additionally, such claims ensure that physicians 
perform their duty of providing pregnant women with thorough and accurate 
information about their pregnancy.16 Despite the prevalence of wrongful birth 
claims, some states have prohibited this cause of action.17 Such laws prevent 
parents like Geler and Faynin from recovering the enormous medical and emo-
tional damages that result from giving birth to and caring for children like 
Shannon.18 
This Note discusses the elements of a wrongful birth claims and analyzes 
the statutes in some states that prohibit this cause of action. Part I explains the 
elements of a wrongful birth claim, as well as the history of these claims. Part 
II discusses the growing prevalence of state statutes that prohibit wrongful 
birth claims, focusing on statutes in Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Arizona. 
Part III argues that these statutory prohibitions are dangerous in that they bar 
parents from recovering the enormous costs of raising their disabled or ill 
child, while also diminishing abortion rights and immunizing physicians from 
liability when they act negligently. Finally, Part III also argues that wrongful 
birth claims are the natural extension of medical malpractice law to advance-
ments in prenatal testing and the legalization of abortion rights. As such, they 
should not be prohibited by states and instead, the merits of these claims 
should be decided through the court system. 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Smith, 513 A.2d at 345–46; Sernovitz, 57 A.3d at 1256. Claims can also be based on failure 
to counsel parents about the likelihood of giving birth to a physically or mentally impaired child. Wil-
liams v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 688 N.E.2d 130, 133 (Ill. 1997) (quoting Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. 
Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 695 (Ill. 1987)). 
 16 Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 
8, 14 (N.J. 1979)) (explaining that without wrongful birth suits, doctors would be immunized from 
liability even when they provided “inadequate guidance to [pregnant patients]”); Barbara Hoberock, 
Abortion Law Is Criticized, Defended Off Base, TULSA WORLD, May 10, 2010, at A1. 
 17 See Smith, 513 A.2d at 345–46. States that have legislatively prohibited the wrongful birth 
cause of action include Arizona, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (2012); MINN. Stat. § 145.424 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.130 (2000); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (2004). 
 18 See Smith, 513 A.2d at 345–46; Geler, 818 A.2d at 409. 
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I. THE WRONGFUL BIRTH CAUSE OF ACTION & STATE LEGISLATIVE 
RESPONSES 
The wrongful birth cause of action is a type of negligence claim brought 
by the parents of children born with disabilities or genetic disorders.19 Implicit 
in this theory of liability is the argument that without the defendant’s negli-
gence, the plaintiff-parents would have had the opportunity to prevent their 
child’s birth by choosing to terminate the pregnancy or, if possible, consider 
treatment options at birth or in utero.20 As the prevalence of wrongful birth 
claims has increased with the advent of prenatal and genetic testing, as well as 
the recognition of abortion rights, some states have responded by enacting 
statutes that bar wrongful birth claims.21 
A. The Wrongful Birth Cause of Action 
The wrongful birth cause of action is part of a group of pregnancy-related 
medical malpractice claims that have become more prevalent due to advance-
ments in genetic testing, as well as the recognition of abortion rights and avail-
ability of such procedures.22 Wrongful birth suits are typically brought by par-
ents who claim they would not have conceived or given birth to a child were it 
not for the defendant’s negligence in performing genetic or prenatal testing, 
testing that if done correctly could have revealed the risk or presence of a 
health condition in the fetus.23 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1981) (explaining that the wrongful 
birth cause of action “is not a significant departure from previous tort law”). 
 20 See Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 695 (Ill. 1987); Greco v. United 
States, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (Nev. 1995); Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 409 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2003); Jeffrey S. Dungan & Sherman Elias, Prenatal Diagnostic Testing, MERCK MANUAL HOME 
HEALTH HANDBOOK FOR PATIENTS & CAREGIVERS (updated Apr. 2014), http://www.merck
manuals.com/home/womens_health_issues/genetic_disorders_detection/prenatal_diagnostic_testing.
html (describing the option of treating some conditions in utero). 
 21 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 188.130 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (2004); 
Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 345–46 (N.H. 1986). 
 22 Robak, 658 F.2d at 475–76; Smith, 513 A.2d at 345–46; Greco, 893 P.2d at 348. 
 23 Williams v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 688 N.E.2d 130, 133 (Ill. 1997). A plaintiff in a wrongful 
birth action is essentially telling her doctors that, 
If you had done what you were supposed to do, I would have known early in my preg-
nancy that I was carrying a severely deformed baby. I would have then terminated the 
pregnancy and would not have had to go through the mental and physical agony of de-
livering this child, nor would I have had to bear the emotional suffering attendant to the 
birth and nurture of the child, nor the extraordinary expense necessary to care for a 
child suffering from such extreme deformity and disability. 
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The wrongful birth cause of action is often compared to and confused with 
wrongful conception (also known as wrongful pregnancy) and wrongful life 
causes of action.24 Parents bring a wrongful conception claim to seek damages 
for the expenses of an unwanted pregnancy and birth that occurs after a failed 
sterilization procedure.25 A wrongful life claim is brought by, or on behalf of, a 
child seeking compensation for the defendant’s failure to properly counsel the 
child’s parents about the child’s condition.26 In contrast, a wrongful birth claim 
is brought by the parents, who claim that were it not for the defendant’s negli-
gence, they would have known about the fetus’s condition, and they would have 
had the opportunity to decide whether or not to abort the fetus.27 
1. Genetic & Prenatal Testing 
In making a wrongful birth claim, the parents must first show that the de-
fendant was negligent in conducting prenatal or genetic testing or counseling 
the parents on the testing results.28 Some forms of testing screen the parents for 
genetic conditions that they may pass on to their children, while prenatal test-
ing screens the fetus itself for abnormalities.29 For many pregnant women, the 
first component of prenatal testing of the fetus is a screening test, usually con-
ducted by serum testing of the mother’s blood, or an ultrasound screening of 
                                                                                                                           
Greco, 893 P.2d at 348. Plaintiffs may also bring wrongful birth claims based on genetic conditions 
that should have been discovered prior to conception, for example, by diagnosing the parents as carri-
ers of genetic conditions or by diagnosing genetic conditions in older children that may be present in 
subsequent children. See Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 834 (N.J. 1981) (describing a claim in 
which parents argued that defendants failed to diagnose their older daughter with cystic fibrosis before 
they conceived a second child who also suffered from the disease); Geler, 818 A.2d at 408–09 (de-
scribing a claim in which parents asserted that defendants failed to perform genetic testing on them 
that would have allowed them to diagnose their fetus as having a terminal illness). 
 24 See Williams, 688 N.E.2d at 132. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 133. Most courts, however, reject wrongful life claims brought by children because the 
theory of liability requires the implicit argument that the child would be better off having never been 
born. Greco, 893 P.2d at 347 (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967), abro-
gated by Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979)). As the court explained, these judgments are “very 
difficult, if not impossible, to make.” Id. 
 27 See Williams, 688 N.E.2d at 133. 
 28 Id. at 132–33 (quoting Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 695). 
 29 See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (plain-
tiff-parents’ claim was based on their physicians’ negligent failure to diagnose their fetus with Tay-
Sachs disease during amniocentesis); Geler, 818 A.2d at 406–07; Rachel Rebouché & Karen H. 
Rothenberg, Mixed Messages: The Intersection of Prenatal Genetic Testing and Abortion, 55 HOW. 
L.J. 983, 987–88 (2012); Dungan & Elias, supra note 20. To predict the possibility of a child being 
born with Tay-Sachs disease, for example, doctors can test the parents of the child to determine if they 
are carriers. Geler, 818 A.2d at 407. If both parents are found to be carriers of the Tay-Sachs gene, 
then amniocentesis is performed on the fetus to confirm the presence of the disease. Id. 
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the fetus to determine the fetus’s risk for genetic abnormalities.30 With this 
type of testing, doctors can screen fetuses for chromosomal abnormalities, as 
well as hundreds of other genetic disorders.31 This type of prenatal testing is 
extremely prevalent and is widely accepted.32 The American Congress of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) recommends that obstetricians test all 
pregnant women for genetic abnormalities before twenty weeks of gestation.33 
If initial serum or ultrasound screening indicates that the fetus has a high 
risk of being born with an abnormality, then the mother typically undergoes 
additional, more invasive testing to diagnose a fetal abnormality by determin-
ing the genotype of the fetus.34 This additional testing is usually performed 
through amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling (“CVS”).35 If amniocen-
tesis or CVS indicates the presence of a genetic abnormality, parents should, 
according to ACOG, receive genetic counseling on their options.36 Such coun-
seling can include information about abortion, potential treatments for the fetus 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Rebouché & Rothenberg, supra note 29, at 987–88. Serum and ultrasound screening tests are 
limited in that they usually cannot definitively diagnose a fetal abnormality. See id. at 988. Instead, 
these tests provide information on the probable risk that a fetus carries a particular genetic disorder, 
usually expressed as the percentage likelihood that the fetus has a genetic condition. Id. at 988–89. 
Serum testing, for example, detects biochemical markers that are associated with certain disorders. See 
id. at 988. Ultrasound screenings can detect evidence of an elevated risk of chromosomal abnormality 
in the fetus. Dungan & Elias, supra note 20. For example, ultrasound screening can be performed to 
measure whether there is abnormal fluid near the back of a fetus’s neck, an indication of an increased 
risk of Down syndrome or other chromosomal abnormality. Id. In addition, ultrasound screening can 
detect obvious structural birth defects, including defects in the brain, spinal cord, heart, and stomach. 
Id. 
 31 Rebouché & Rothenberg, supra note 29, at 988. 
 32 Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 234 
(2002). Routine serum and ultrasound screenings are used for many aspects of prenatal care beyond 
diagnosis of fetal abnormalities. See Dungan & Elias, supra note 20. For example, a mother’s blood is 
usually tested for indicators of miscarriage, slow fetal growth, placental abruption, or the presence of 
additional fetuses. Id. Additionally, blood tests also provide information on the fetus’s risk of being 
born with neural defects like anencephaly, or spinal cord defects like spina bifida. Id. Ultrasound 
screening, also routine, is used to confirm the length of a pregnancy, to determine the presence of 
multiple fetuses, to determine whether the fetus has died, and also to detect a number of birth defects. 
Id. 
 33 Rebouché & Rothenberg, supra note 29, at 988. 
 34 See id. at 989–90. Determining the genotype of a fetus will provide information about the pres-
ence of a genetic condition, but, like screening, it is limited in its ability to definitively predict how the 
condition will manifest in the potential child. See id. 
 35 Id. at 989. CVS and amniocentesis require the physician to extract fetal cells, either through the 
mother’s abdomen or vagina. Id. Amniocentesis is performed at fifteen to seventeen weeks of gesta-
tion, while CVS can be performed earlier, at ten to fourteen weeks of gestation. Id. There is a one 
percent risk of miscarriage associated with both procedures. Id. Because both procedures are costly, 
uncomfortable for the mother, and carry the risk of miscarriage, only about two percent of pregnant 
women choose to undergo these types of testing. See id. 
 36 See id. at 990. 
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during pregnancy, and preparations for raising a child with the condition.37 At 
this point, parents who receive an abnormal diagnosis may choose to continue 
with the pregnancy, to terminate the pregnancy, or if possible, to begin initial 
treatment for the condition prenatally.38 
Prenatal genetic testing will likely become more common in the future.39 
Recently developed noninvasive tests to collect fetal DNA are more accurate 
than standard blood tests in screening for chromosomal and genetic abnormali-
ties.40 As the American healthcare landscape changes and genetic prenatal test-
ing becomes more advanced, there promises to be an increase in more accurate 
and less costly and invasive testing.41 
2. Components of a Wrongful Birth Claim 
As a type of medical malpractice claim, wrongful birth claims share the 
basic elements of the negligence cause of action.42 The first of these basic ele-
ments requires the parents to establish the existence of the physician’s duty to 
the plaintiffs, typically based on a doctor-patient relationship between the phy-
sician and the pregnant woman.43 The plaintiffs must demonstrate that the phy-
sician breached that duty by failing to adhere to the applicable standard of 
care.44 Next, the plaintiffs must also show a proximate causal connection be-
                                                                                                                           
 37 See id. 
 38 Id.; Dungan & Elias, supra note 20. Some fetal abnormalities that are detected early can be 
treated before birth. Dungan & Elias, supra note 20. For example, the mother of a female fetus with 
congenital adrenal hyperplasia, a disorder that causes the adrenal glands to produce excessive amounts 
of male hormones, can take corticosteroid to prevent the female fetus from developing male character-
istics. Id. 
 39 See Rebouché & Rothenberg, supra note 29, at 985, 990. 
 40 Diana W. Bianchi et al., DNA Sequencing Versus Standard Prenatal Aneuploidy Screening, 
370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 799, 799 (2014). 
 41 See id.; Rebouché & Rothenberg, supra note 29, at 985–86, 990 (noting that the Affordable 
Care Act requires healthcare plans to cover many prenatal services, including genetic screening and 
testing and that non-invasive testing will soon take the place of current screening). 
 42 See Robak, 658 F.2d at 476; Molloy v. Meier, 660 N.W.2d 444, 450 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 43 See Molloy, 660 N.W.2d at 450 (explaining that medical malpractice claims must show a phy-
sician-patient relationship in order to demonstrate that the doctor owed the plaintiff a duty of care); 
Smith, 513 A.2d at 346 (“If the plaintiff establishes that a physician-patient relationship with respect 
to the pregnancy existed between the defendants and her, it follows that the defendants assumed a 
duty to use reasonable care in attending and treating her.”). 
 44 Robak, 658 F.2d at 476 (explaining that a wrongful birth claim “involves a failure by a physi-
cian to meet a required standard of care, which resulted in specific damages to the plaintiffs”); Greco, 
893 P.2d at 348; Fernandez v. Admirand, 843 P.2d 354, 358 (Nev. 1992). The standard of care is a 
question of fact that is determined based on the standards of the medical profession. Smith, 513 A.2d 
at 346. If the court finds that the applicable standard of care demanded that the defendants test for or 
diagnose a fetus’s condition, and the defendants failed to fulfill that obligation, then they breached 
their duty of due care. Id. at 347. 
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tween the negligent conduct and the resulting injury.45 Finally, the plaintiffs 
must establish that actual loss or damages resulted from the physician’s negli-
gence.46 These damages may include the unwanted medical costs and emotion-
al damages of giving birth to an unhealthy or disabled child.47 
Wrongful birth claims can be brought based on the defendant’s negli-
gence at multiple points before or during the mother’s pregnancy.48 When a 
wrongful birth claim is based on negligence before pregnancy, the cause of 
action may stem from a physician’s alleged failure to diagnose a genetic condi-
tion or disease in an earlier child, if a later child is born with the same condi-
tion.49 In addition, the cause of action can also be brought based on a physi-
cian’s negligence in performing or failing to perform genetic testing on the 
child’s parents.50 Similarly, the cause of action may be brought based on a 
physician’s failure to perform or properly handle a prenatal genetic or diagnos-
tic test on the fetus.51 Additionally, wrongful birth claims can also be based on 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Provenzano v. Integrated Genetics, 22 F. Supp. 2d 406, 416 (C.D.N.J. 1998); Greco, 893 
P.2d at 348. 
 46 See Arche v. U.S., Dep’t of the Army, 798 P.2d 477, 481 (Kan. 1990); Shull v. Reid, 258 P.3d 
521, 524–25 (Okla. 2011). 
 47 Arche, 798 P.2d at 481 (holding that the “expenses caused by the child’s handicaps may be 
recovered, but not those expenses natural to raising any child”); Shull, 258 P.3d at 525 (holding that 
damages could be recovered for the losses proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence, but not 
for the parents’ emotional distress); Dungan & Elias, supra note 20 (describing treatment options in 
utero). 
 48 See Johnson v. Super. Ct., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 650, 653 (Ct. App. 2002) (allowing plaintiff-
parents’ claim based on infertility doctors’ and sperm bank’s failure to test donor sperm for a heredi-
tary kidney condition); Geler, 818 A.2d at 406 (explaining that the plaintiff-parents’ claim was based 
on the defendants’ negligence in failing to test the plaintiffs and their fetus for Tay-Sachs disease); 
Sernovitz v. Dershaw, 57 A.3d 1254, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (explaining that plaintiff-parents’ 
wrongful birth claim was based on the defendants’ failure to properly diagnose the mother as a carrier 
of the hereditary condition familial dysautonomia). 
 49 See Schroeder, 432 A.2d at 834 (permitting plaintiff-parents’ claim based on the defendants’ 
failure to timely diagnose their older child with cystic fibrosis before they conceived a second child 
who also suffered from the disease). 
 50 See Geler, 818 A.2d at 406; Sernovitz, 57 A.3d at 1256 (alleging that doctor’s failure to inform 
parents that mother carried a gene mutation deprived parents of the informed option to choose to ter-
minate the pregnancy). 
 51 See Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880, 881 (D.C. 1987); Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 694–95; 
Sernovitz, 57 A.3d at 1256; Aimee Green, Despite Abuse from Critics, Attorney Says Parents of Down 
Syndrome Child Pursued ‘Wrongful Birth’ Suit to Secure Her Financial Future, OREGONIAN, Mar. 9, 
2012, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2012/03/despite_abuse_from_critics_
par.html. In Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, a doctor incorrectly told the plaintiff-
parents that amniocentesis eliminated “any possibility that the fetus would have Tay-Sachs disease.” 451 
F. Supp. at 693–94. The Gildiners’ son, however, was born with Tay-Sachs disease, and the couple sued 
their doctors for the medical expenses and emotional suffering that resulted from their son being born 
with the disease. Id. at 694–95. The court concluded that “the public policy of Pennsylvania supports the 
recognition of a cause of action for damages arising from negligence in the performance of testing for 
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negligence during pregnancy when a physician fails to discover and inform 
parents of non-genetic fetal defects, such as a health condition in the mother 
that could adversely affect the health of the fetus.52 
In addition to duty and negligence, plaintiffs bringing wrongful birth 
claims must establish proximate causation.53 Notably, a wrongful birth claim 
does not allege that the defendant’s negligence actually caused the child’s inju-
ry.54 Instead, the plaintiffs allege that because of the defendant’s negligence, 
they did not know about the fetus’s impairments and, therefore, they did not 
have the opportunity to use that information to evaluate whether to terminate 
the pregnancy.55 Thus, parents are not suing for the child’s impairment itself, 
but rather for the loss of their choice not to give birth to the unhealthy child.56 
Courts typically use a subjective standard to determine causation, asking 
whether the particular plaintiffs were deprived of the chance to “accept or re-
ject a parental relationship.”57 It is not necessary for parents to prove decisive-
ly that they would have aborted an unhealthy fetus because the crux of their 
claim is that the defendant’s negligence deprived them of the opportunity to 
make that choice.58 
                                                                                                                           
Tay-Sachs disease[]” and that the Gildiners could recover damages for their son’s medical treatment. Id. 
at 695–96. Parents of children born with non-terminal diseases like Down syndrome have also sued for 
wrongful birth when their medical providers failed to diagnose the condition prenatally. See Haymon, 
535 A.2d at 881 (allowing a mother of a child born with Down syndrome to recover medical expenses 
that would not have occurred but for her doctor’s failure to counsel her properly regarding prenatal test-
ing options); Green, supra (awarding parents of a child with Down syndrome $2.9 million after the doc-
tor told the mother that her prenatal testing results were normal). 
 52 See Robak, 658 F.2d at 471 (explaining that plaintiff-parents brought a wrongful birth claim 
based on the defendants’ failure to diagnose the mother with rubella while she was pregnant, which 
resulted in fetal defects). 
 53 See Provenzano, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 416; Greco, 893 P.2d at 348. 
 54 See Provenzano, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 413–14, 418 (explaining that the child’s genetic condition 
was not at issue, but that the actual injury was the child’s “very birth, or otherwise put, the deprivation 
of the [plaintiffs’] opportunity to abort [the] fetus”); Greco, 893 P.2d at 348 (comparing a wrongful 
birth claim to a medical malpractice claim against a doctor for failing to diagnose cancer in a timely 
manner and explaining that while the doctor did not cause the cancer, the doctor’s negligence meant 
that the patient did not have the opportunity to treat the disease properly). 
 55 See Geler, 818 A.2d at 409; Greco, 893 P.2d at 348. 
 56 See Provenzano, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 418; Geler, 818 A.2d at 409; Greco, 893 P.2d at 348. 
 57 See Provenzano, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 416–17; Schroeder, 432 A.2d at 840. Courts typically focus 
on subjective “but for” causation to establish the element of proximate causation. See Robak, 658 F.2d 
at 477; Provenzano, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 416; Smith, 513 A.2d at 347 (stating that proof of causation 
would be established if the plaintiff could “show that, but for the defendants’ negligent failure to in-
form [the mother] of the risks of bearing a child with birth defects, [the mother] would have obtained 
an abortion”). 
 58 See Provenzano, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 416 (explaining that plaintiffs need not conclusively prove 
that they would have aborted the fetus, “[r]ather, proximate cause may be established by evidence 
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Courts often struggle with how to appropriately award damages in wrong-
ful birth cases.59 Although most courts are willing to compensate parents for 
the extraordinary medical costs associated with giving birth to and caring for 
an unhealthy child, some courts are hesitant to award parents damages cover-
ing the total cost of caring for their child.60 In most wrongful birth cases, the 
parents desired a child and planned to support their child, which, courts have 
stated, is the obligation of all parents.61 Thus, while the costs of raising the 
child that stem from the child’s disability or condition may be recovered, those 
costs that are inherent in raising any child may not be recovered.62 Some courts 
also award parents damages for the emotional distress of giving birth to and 
caring for an unhealthy or disabled child.63 
B. Wrongful Birth Claims in the Courtroom 
Although the increase in wrongful birth claims since the 1980s is due in 
part to the recognition of a legal right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, the first 
wrongful birth claim was brought well before Roe.64 In Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 
                                                                                                                           
demonstrating that the defendant’s negligence deprived the plaintiffs of their right to accept or reject a 
parental relationship). 
 59 See Arche, 798 P.2d at 481; Greco, 895 P.2d at 349. 
 60 See Robak, 658 F.2d at 478–79 (noting that the majority of courts allow plaintiffs to recover all 
damages associated with the birth of the child). But see Arche, 798 P.2d at 481 (holding that the plain-
tiff-parents could recover costs associated with the child’s disability, “but not those expenses natural 
to raising any child”); Shull, 258 P.3d at 525 (holding that plaintiffs in wrongful birth suits could re-
cover only “extraordinary expenses, not the normal and foreseeable costs of raising a normal, healthy 
child”). In granting the plaintiff-parents damages for all of the costs of raising their unhealthy child, 
the court in Robak v. United States explained that injuries in wrongful birth actions are not based on 
injuries to the child, but rather injuries to the parents themselves. See 658 F.2d at 479. The court fur-
ther reasoned that because the defendant’s failure to inform the plaintiff of the fetus’s possible health 
condition denies the plaintiff the opportunity to choose to abort the pregnancy, the birth of the child 
and all expenses related to raising the child are the proximate result of the defendant’s negligence. Id. 
Thus, the court concluded that it is inappropriate to deduct the costs of raising a normal child from the 
costs of raising the unhealthy child because, if not for the defendants’ negligence, the plaintiffs would 
not have given birth to a child at all. Id. at 478–79. 
 61 See Arche, 798 P.2d at 481; Shull, 258 P.3d at 523–24. 
 62 See Arche, 798 P.2d at 481; Shull, 258 P.3d at 525. But see Greco, 893 P.2d at 350 (rejecting 
the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs’ damage award should be offset by the costs of raising a 
healthy child, and instead following the “clear and workable” standard for compensatory damages in 
negligence cases). 
 63 Greco, 893 P.2d at 351 (awarding emotional distress damages to the plaintiff-mother and not-
ing that many other courts also do so). But see Arche, 798 P.2d at 482; Shull, 258 P.3d at 525 (holding 
that emotional distress damages could not be recovered in a wrongful birth case because the injury at 
issue was not caused by the defendants). 
 64 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Smith, 513 A.2d at 345–46 (citing W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 370 (5th ed. 1984)) (explaining that the growing preva-
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a couple sued their physician for the wrongful birth of their son in 1959.65 Ear-
ly in her pregnancy, the mother informed her physician that she had recently 
been diagnosed with rubella.66 Despite medical evidence that contracting ru-
bella during pregnancy could result in infant birth defects, the doctor told the 
mother that the illness would have no effect on her unborn child.67 Although 
the couple’s child seemed healthy at birth, a few weeks later he began to dis-
play signs of significant disability, including sight, hearing, and speech de-
fects.68 Because of his disabilities, the child underwent several operations, but 
even after the operations, his health remained “seriously impaired.”69 
The parents sued the physician arguing that his failure to inform the 
mother of the possible effects of rubella on her pregnancy denied them the op-
portunity to choose to abort their pregnancy.70 Although the court expressed 
sympathy for the parents’ difficult situation, the court ultimately dismissed 
their wrongful birth claim, as well as a wrongful life claim brought on their 
son’s behalf, explaining that the child’s right to live “is greater than and pre-
cludes [the parents’] right not to endure emotional and financial injury.”71 
While this unsuccessful claim was brought before Roe, both the Roe deci-
sion and the increased availability of genetic and prenatal testing in the late 
twentieth century led to a growing acceptance of wrongful birth claims.72 In 
                                                                                                                           
lence of wrongful birth claims is due in part to the Roe Court’s recognition of the legal right to abor-
tion and calling Gleitman the “‘fountainhead’ for debate” in wrongful birth cases); Gleitman, 227 
A.2d at 689. 
 65 Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 689–90. Interestingly, the three counts of the parents’ complaint were 
divided among the three family members. See id. at 690. The first count of the complaint was a 
wrongful life claim brought on behalf of the child, seeking damages for his birth defects. See id. The 
mother brought the second count for her emotional damages resulting from her son’s condition, and 
the third count was brought by the child’s father, who sought damages for the costs he incurred in 
caring for the child. Id. 
 66 Id. at 690. 
 67 Id. (noting that the plaintiffs’ expert medical witness testified that maternal cases of rubella 
during the first trimester of pregnancy can result in infant birth defects twenty to fifty percent of the 
time). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 691. The doctor acknowledged that he had a duty as a physician to inform the mother 
about the possibility of birth defects stemming from her illness. Id. at 690. He claimed, however, that 
he had informed her that there was a twenty percent possibility of her child being born with birth 
defects and that while some doctors would perform an abortion for this reason, the doctor did not 
think it was appropriate. Id. at 690–91. 
 71 See id. at 692–93 (explaining that claims for wrongful birth are “precluded by the countervail-
ing public policy supporting the preciousness of human life”). 
 72 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 114; Robak, 658 F.2d at 471; Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 689. In Smith v. Cote, 
the court explained that both the development of tests for genetic diseases and fetal defects and the 
increased availability of legal abortions after Roe account for the increase in successful wrongful birth 
cases in the final quarter of the twentieth century. 513 A.2d at 345–46. Important scientific develop-
 
376 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:365 
Robak v. United States, for example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected two common arguments against wrongful birth, showing the court’s 
willingness to apply existing negligence law to these new claims.73 After he 
was sued for failing to inform the plaintiff-mother that she had rubella, a con-
dition that caused her daughter to be born deaf and blind, the defendant-doctor 
argued that the plaintiff had not established proximate causation for two rea-
sons.74 First, the defendant argued that there was no proximate causation be-
cause the injury to the fetus occurred when the mother contracted rubella, not 
when the defendants failed to diagnose the fetus’s condition.75 The court disa-
greed with the defendants’ argument, finding that “[a] negligent act need not 
be the sole cause of the injury complained of in order to be a proximate cause 
of that injury.”76 The cause of action itself was not based on the fetus’s condi-
tion, but rather the defendants’ failure to diagnose the condition.77 The defend-
ant also attacked the plaintiff’s causation argument, arguing that the plaintiff 
could not have obtained a legal abortion in Alabama at the time she became 
pregnant.78 The court rejected this argument, finding that the plaintiff could 
have easily obtained a legal abortion in a neighboring state.79 Thus, the court 
found that the defendants breached their duty to the child’s parents by denying 
them the chance to have an abortion, and were, therefore, a proximate cause of 
the plaintiffs’ injuries.80 
Provenzano v. Integrated Genetics, a more recent case from 1998, further 
demonstrates courts’ application of medical malpractice concepts to wrongful 
birth claims.81 When their eight-month-old daughter died of an undiagnosed 
                                                                                                                           
ments include the creation of “‘sophisticated biochemical and cytogenic tests for assaying amniotic 
fluid and maternal and fetal blood.’” Id. at 345 (quoting Alexander Morgan Capron, Tort Liability in 
Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 626 (1979)). For example, amniocentesis, which allows 
doctors to remove fluid from a fetus and perform tests for a number of conditions, was once consid-
ered experimental, but by the 1970s became a routine method of testing for fetal defects. Id. at 346. 
 73 Robak, 658 F.2d at 471. 
 74 Id. at 471, 473. In the early stages of her pregnancy, the mother tested positive for rubella, but 
her physicians never informed her that she was sick or that the illness could adversely affect her fetus. 
Id. at 473. The couple sued the mother’s doctor for wrongful birth. Id. at 471. 
 75 Id. at 471, 473. 
 76 Id. at 477. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. at 476–77 (explaining that abortion was legal in a number of states at the time the plain-
tiff became pregnant and it would have been perfectly legal for the mother to “take advantage of more 
lenient laws in another state”) The court granted the plaintiff-parents damages for the birth of the 
unhealthy child, “and all expenses resulting therefrom, were thus the proximate result of defendant’s 
negligence.” Id. at 479. 
 80 Id. at 479. 
 81 See Provenzano, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 409–10. 
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genetic disease, the plaintiff-parents sued the mother’s doctors and the compa-
ny that performed their prenatal testing for failing to inform them about the 
fetus’s condition and that they could have aborted the fetus.82 The court al-
lowed the parents to bring their claim, determining that they need not show 
conclusively that, had they known it was an option, they would have aborted 
the unhealthy fetus.83 Instead, the plaintiff need only shown that they were de-
prived of the option to make that choice.84 
II. THE DANGER OF STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS ON  
WRONGFUL BIRTH CLAIMS 
Although many courts after Gleitman v. Cosgrove came to accept the 
wrongful birth cause of action as a type of medical malpractice claim, some 
states’ statutes prohibit wrongful birth claims.85 While these statutes prohibit an 
entire cause of action, they focus on barring plaintiffs from making the essential 
causation argument that, but for the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff 
would have chosen to terminate the pregnancy.86 Although these prohibitions 
have faced criticism and legal challenges, they are becoming increasingly popu-
lar, and a number of states now statutorily prohibit wrongful birth claims.87 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See id. The plaintiff–mother was pregnant with twin girls, one of whom, Tiffany, was shown 
via prenatal testing and ultrasounds to have abnormalities. Id. at 409. Tiffany was born with trisomy 
14 mosaicism, and died eight months later. Id. The plaintiff-parents sued the mother’s doctors, con-
tending that they never told her she could have aborted the unhealthy fetus without affecting the other 
fetus. Id. at 409–10. 
 83 Id. at 416, 419. The court further explained that the issue of whether the parents would have 
aborted the unhealthy fetus is a question of fact for the jury, and conflicting evidence regarding 
whether the plaintiffs would have actually decided to abort the fetus, had they known about its health 
condition, was not fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim. Id. at 417. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 188.130 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (2004); 
Provenzano v. Integrated Genetics, 22 F. Supp. 2d 406, 416 (C.D.N.J. 1998); Greco v. United States, 
893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995); Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
 86 See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 689 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by Berman v. Allan, 404 
A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Georgia Dullea, Courts Weigh Value of Unwanted Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1982, 
at B6; Jonathan V. Last, From Blessing to Curse: The Evolution of ‘Wrongful Birth’ Lawsuits, WKLY. 
STANDARD (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/blessing-curse_640524.html. States 
that have prohibited the wrongful birth cause of action include Arizona, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
and South Dakota. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719; MINN. STAT. § 145.424; MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 188.130; OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2. 
 87 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719; MINN. STAT. § 145.424; MO. REV. STAT. § 188.130; 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2; Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. 
Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 816 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Hoberock, supra note 16. 
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A. The Oklahoma Statute 
In 2010, the Oklahoma legislature enacted House Bill 2656, (“the Okla-
homa statute”) which prohibits wrongful birth claims.88 The legislature explic-
itly stated that its intent in enacting the prohibition on wrongful life and 
wrongful birth claims was to acknowledge that it is against public policy to 
recognize injury and award damages for the birth of a child.89 
The Oklahoma statute defines a wrongful birth action as: 
[A] cause of action that is brought by a parent or other person who is 
legally required to provide for the support of a child, which seeks 
economic or noneconomic damages because of a condition of the 
child that existed at the time of the child’s birth, and which is based 
on a claim that a person’s act or omission contributed to the moth-
er’s not having obtained an abortion.90 
The statute goes on to prohibit wrongful birth claims by immunizing defend-
ants from damages based on “any condition that existed at the time of a child’s 
birth if the claim is that the defendant’s act or omission contributed to the 
mother’s not having obtained an abortion.”91 Thus, the causation element of 
the wrongful birth claim is impossible for plaintiffs to establish.92 
                                                                                                                           
 88 OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12. The statute was enacted in response to Liddington v. Burns, 
the case in which the U.S. District Court, applying Oklahoma law, found that the state would recog-
nize wrongful birth actions and that the plaintiffs could recover “the extraordinary medical expenses 
and other pecuniary losses proximately caused by the [defendant’s] negligence.” 916 F. Supp. 1127, 
1133 (W.D. Okla. 1995); see Shull v. Reid, 258 P.3d 521, 524 (Okla. 2011). The Liddington court, 
however, denied the plaintiffs damages for the costs of raising a normal, healthy child, finding that 
those expenses are “[j]ust as certainly . . . not recoverable.” See 916 F. Supp. at 1133. 
 89 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12; Shull, 258 P.3d at 524. 
 90 OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12(B)(3). 
 91 Id. § 1-741.12(C). The law does not prohibit claims focused on the health of the mother: 
[t]his section shall not preclude causes of action based on claims that, but for a wrong-
ful act or omission, maternal death or injury would not have occurred, or handicap, dis-
ease, or disability of an individual prior to birth would have been prevented, cured, or 
ameliorated in a manner that preserved the health and life of the affected individual. 
Id. § 1-741.12(D). In addition, the statute also prohibits wrongful life actions, defining those claims 
as: 
a cause of action that is brought by or on behalf of a child, which seeks economic or 
noneconomic damages for the child because of a condition of the child that existed at 
the time of the child’s birth, and which is based on a claim that a person’s act or omis-
sion contributed to the mother’s not having obtained an abortion. 
See id. § 1-741.12(B)(2), (C). 
 92 See id. § 1-741.12(B)(3). 
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Oklahoma State Representative Daniel Sullivan introduced the Oklahoma 
statute to the state’s House of Representatives as House Bill 2656, describing 
the bill as “a simple, noncontroversial” piece of legislation that makes “it ille-
gal to sue a doctor claiming ‘wrongful birth’ because the doctor failed to con-
vince the mother to abort a child.”93 Sullivan further explained his reasons for 
authoring the bill by stating, “[t]o argue that a child would be better off dead 
than given a chance at life is a gross perversion of our justice system and 
should never be a legitimate basis for suing a doctor.”94 Sullivan’s bill eventu-
ally passed the Oklahoma House of Representatives and Senate in 2010 with a 
number of other abortion-related pieces of legislation.95 However, Oklahoma 
Governor Brad Henry vetoed the bill, describing the legislation as “potentially 
detrimental to all pregnant women and their families” because it prevents 
women from seeking legal recourse when a physician knowingly or negligent-
ly withholds information about the pregnancy.96 The Oklahoma legislature 
overrode the Governor’s veto and the bill became law on April 27, 2010.97 
Oklahoma’s law was met with praise from anti-abortion groups, as well 
as the Oklahoma State Medical Association, which stated that the Oklahoma 
statute would “give physicians the most freedom to practice without fear of 
malpractice lawsuits.”98 As Tony Lauinger, chairman of Oklahomans for Life 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Press Release, Okla. House of Representatives, Lawmakers Vow to Continue Pro-Life 
Fight (Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://www.okhouse.gov/Media/News_Story.aspx?NewsID=3588. 
Oklahoma State Senator Brian Crain was the principal author of the bill in the Senate. Press Release, 
Okla. State Senate, Senate Republicans Advance Pro-Life Measures (Apr. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_releases/press_releases_2010/pr20100420a.html. 
 94 See Press Release, Lawmakers Vow to Continue Pro-Life Fight, supra note 93. 
 95 See id.; Press Release, Senate Republicans Advance Pro-Life Measures, supra note 93. House 
Bill 2656 overwhelmingly passed the Oklahoma House of Representatives and the Oklahoma Senate 
by a vote of 94 to 4 and 35 to 11 respectively. See Press Release, Lawmakers Vow to Continue Pro-
Life Fight, supra note 93; Press Release, Senate Republicans Advance Pro-Life Measures, supra note 
93. 
 96 See OKLA. S. JOURNAL, 52-49, 2nd Sess. 1454 (2010); Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry Ve-
toes Abortion Bills, NEWS ON 6 (Apr. 24, 2010), http://www.newson6.com/story/12364814/oklahoma-
governor-brad-henry-vetoes-abortion-bills?clienttype=printable. 
 97 See OKLA. S. JOURNAL, 52-47, 2nd Sess. 1370 (2010). The gubernatorial veto was overridden 
using the bill’s emergency clause, which required a three-fourths majority vote from each chamber of 
the Oklahoma State legislature. Michael McNutt, Henry Vetoes Anti-Abortion Bills, NEWS OK (Apr. 
24, 2010), http://newsok.com/henry-vetoes-anti-abortion-bills/article/3456575. During the subsequent 
veto override, the bill was first passed by the House of Representatives with an 84 to 12 vote, and was 
then passed by the Senate with a 36 to 12 vote. See OKLA. S. JOURNAL, 52–48, 2nd Sess. 1377 (2010); 
OKLA. S. JOURNAL, 52-47, 2nd Sess. 1370 (2010). 
 98 See Hoberock, supra note 16; Liz Townsend, Legislators Easily Override Governor’s Veto: 
Oklahoma Adds to Recent Pro-Life Successes with Latest Omnibus Bill, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS 
(May 2008), available at http://www.nrlc.org/archive/news/2008/NRL05/Oklahoma.html. Other sup-
port for the bill came from the Oklahoma State Medical Association, which tried to minimize con-
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put it, “[t]he pressure in our culture for ‘quality control’ carries over for some 
to their attitude about babies, and has had a corrosive effect on our society’s 
respect for the sanctity of human life.”99 Other groups, however, sharply criti-
cized the statute, arguing that the Oklahoma law would interfere with doctor-
patient relationships, allowing doctors to withhold information from their pa-
tients.100 
B. The Pennsylvania Statute & Legal Challenges 
In 2010, Pennsylvania also enacted a statute (“the Pennsylvania statute”) 
prohibiting wrongful birth claims.101 As with the Oklahoma statute, the Penn-
sylvania statute prohibited wrongful birth claims by barring the plaintiff from 
making the argument that, but for the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff 
would have chosen to abort the pregnancy.102 
After the Pennsylvania statute was enacted, two sets of parents separately 
challenged the validity of the statute.103 In Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Uni-
versity Hospital, the parents of a child born with spina bifida challenged the 
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute under the Pennsylvania and United 
States Constitutions.104 The Pennsylvania Superior Court dismissed the plain-
                                                                                                                           
cerns about the statute, calling them “overblown.” Hoberock, supra note 16. Representative Sullivan 
explained that the concerns were unfounded because, 
[p]hysicians are still required under their standard of care to provide all the relevant in-
formation they have to the patient . . . All this really says is that on the backside, some-
one can’t come out and say you should have advised me to have an abortion. That is a 
completely different issue than giving the mother the relevant information . . . . Even if 
a physician was pro-life and was aware of abnormalities, it is still their obligation to 
advise the patient of what they know of and the patient has the ultimate decision . . . [i]t 
is not the physician’s decision at that point. 
Id. 
 99 Townsend, supra note 98. Lauinger also noted that wrongful birth claims “severely undermine 
society’s respect for persons with disabilities, and promote the specter of eugenic abortions.” Id. 
 100 See id. Mary Alice Carr from the National Institute for Reproductive Health called the statute 
“shocking” and “egregious.” Hoberock, supra note 16. Carr said it is the first time that she was aware 
of that “the state has interceded in a doctor-patient relationship that would allow the withholding of 
information from a patient.” Id. 
 101 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (2010). 
 102 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a). The Penn-
sylvania statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]here shall be no cause of action or award of dam-
ages on behalf of any person based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a per-
son once conceived would not or should not have been born.” 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a). 
 103 See Flickinger v. Wanczyk, 843 F. Supp. 32, 32–33 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Dansby, 623 A.2d at 816. 
 104 Dansby, 623 A.2d at 818. In Dansby, the mother’s physician mistakenly tested amniotic fluid 
from another woman and the mother was incorrectly told she was carrying a healthy fetus. Id. A lower 
court dismissed the Dansbys’ wrongful birth claim, finding that the Pennsylvania wrongful birth stat-
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tiffs’ constitutional arguments, however, finding that the Pennsylvania statute 
did not constrain a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.105 
In Flickinger v. Wanczyk, the parents of another child born with spina bifi-
da sued their healthcare providers for wrongful birth and, like the plaintiffs in 
Dansby, claimed that the Pennsylvania statute prohibiting wrongful birth claims 
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act.106 In their § 1983 claim, the 
Flickingers argued that the Pennsylvania statute deprived them of “their right to 
make a timely and informed decision as to whether to terminate the pregnancy at 
issue in this case.”107 Citing Dansby, the federal district court determined that the 
Pennsylvania statute did not violate the Civil Rights Act.108 Despite the failure of 
these constitutional arguments, the Pennsylvania statute was recently invalidated 
on a technical issue and, therefore, is not currently in effect.109 
                                                                                                                           
ute barred the claim. Id. at 817–18. On appeal, the Dansbys argued that the Pennsylvania statute was 
an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it limited the fundamental right to choose to terminate a 
pregnancy. Id. at 818–19. Additionally, they argued that the Pennsylvania statute violated both Article 
I, section 1 and Article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the statute limited “the 
exercise of a woman’s fundamental right to choose an abortion over childbirth” and also treated medi-
cal malpractice victims unequally. Id. at 818–20. 
 105 Id. at 819. The court explained that a woman’s “freedom to decide [to have an abortion] is not 
impaired by a statute which denies her the right to bring an action against the physician who has neg-
ligently failed to advise her correctly regarding the health of the fetus.” Id. 
 106 Flickinger, 843 F. Supp. at 33–34. While she was pregnant, Deborah Flickinger underwent a 
prenatal test to determine if the fetus she was carrying had spina bifida, but because of a testing error, 
she was told that her child would be born healthy. See id. at 34. The Flickingers only learned that their 
daughter would be born with spina bifida when Deborah was 37 or 38 weeks pregnant, at which point 
she could not legally obtain an abortion in Pennsylvania. Id. 
 107 Id. at 35. In order to make a successful claim under the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must 
show “that a person acting under the color of state law violated the claimant’s constitutional rights.” 
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 108 See Flickinger, 843 F. Supp. at 33, 37. 
 109 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (2010); Sernovitz v. Dershaw, 57 A.3d 1254, 1266 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). In Sernovitz v. Dershaw, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the Penn-
sylvania statute was unconstitutional because it violated the state’s “single-subject” rule. 57 A.3d at 
1266. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[n]o bill shall be passed containing more than one 
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codify-
ing or compiling the law or a part thereof.” PA. CONST. art. III, § 3; Sernovitz, 57 A.3d at 1258. The 
court noted that the Pennsylvania statute violated this constitutional provision because it contained “a 
veritable potpourri of legislation” including legislation on magisterial district judges, DNA testing, 
and criminal and civil law. Sernovitz, 57 A.3d at 1263–64. The defendant and the Pennsylvania Gen-
eral Assembly, as an intervenor, have appealed the Superior Court’s ruling to Pennsylvania’s highest 
court. See Sernovitz, 57 A.3d at 1266, appeal docketed, 140 MAL 2014 (Pa. Feb. 26, 2013). 
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C. The Arizona Statute 
The Arizona legislature followed Oklahoma and Pennsylvania’s lead and 
in 2012 passed its own statute prohibiting wrongfu.l birth claims (“the Arizona 
statute”).110 Similar to the Oklahoma and Pennsylvania statutes, the Arizona 
statute prohibits wrongful birth claims by immunizing physicians from damag-
es “in any civil action for wrongful birth based on a claim that, but for an act 
or omission of the defendant, a child or children would not or should not have 
been born.”111 In a departure from the Oklahoma statute, however, the Arizona 
statute explicitly states that its provisions do not apply to cases in which the 
physician’s actions constitute “an intentional or grossly negligent act or omis-
sion.”112 In praising the passage of the Arizona statute, its sponsor, Senator 
Nancy Barto of Phoenix said that the language of the statute would “still allow 
‘true malpractice suits’ to proceed.”113 
Although the Arizona statute is more narrowly tailored than the Oklaho-
ma statute, members of the Arizona House of Representatives still expressed 
doubts about the constitutionality of the law.114 During debate on the passage 
of the statute, Tim Fleming, the attorney for the Arizona House of Representa-
tives Rules Committee, opined that the section of the statute that bars wrongful 
birth claims is unconstitutional.115 Fleming explained that he believed that pre-
vious cases in Arizona had established a common law claim for both wrongful 
conception and wrongful birth.116 In support of his contention, Fleming cited 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (2012). 
 111 See id. § 12-719(A); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 8305(a). 
 112 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719(D); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12. 
 113 Senate Approves Bill on ‘Wrongful Births,’ ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), http://az
capitoltimes.com/news/2012/03/06/senate-approves-bill-on-wrongful-births/. In contrast, critics of the 
Oklahoma statute have argued that the broader Oklahoma statute could also bar claims against physi-
cians even when the physician acted intentionally in denying the woman information about the health 
of the fetus. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741.12; Hoberock, supra note 16. 
 114 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719(A); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741.12; 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 8305(a); Audio tape: Arizona House of Representatives Rules Committee (Mar. 22, 
2012, 0:59–5:55), available at http://azleg.granicus.com/ViewPublisher.php?view_id=13. 
 115 See Arizona House of Representatives Rules Committee, supra note 114. 
 116 See Walker ex rel. Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 738 (Ariz. 1990); Univ. of Ariz. Health Sci. 
Ctr. v. Super. Ct. of State ex rel. Maricopa Cnty., 667 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Ariz. 1983); Arizona House of 
Representatives Rules Committee, supra note 114. Fleming also explained, however, that the portion 
of the statute that prohibits wrongful life claims is likely not unconstitutional, as Walker also held that 
Arizona did not recognize a cause of action for wrongful life. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
719(D) (2012); Walker, 790 P.2d at 741; Arizona House of Representatives Rules Committee, supra 
note 114. Therefore, if the Arizona statute were challenged, Fleming predicted that while a court 
would likely find the portion of the statute prohibiting wrongful birth claims to be unconstitutional, 
the court would also apply the doctrine of severability, allowing the remaining sections to remain 
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two earlier Arizona cases.117 First, in University of Arizona Health Center v. 
Superior Court of Arizona, the state’s highest court held that Arizona would 
recognize wrongful conception claims brought by parents alleging that the 
conception of a child was caused by the defendant’s negligence.118 Later, in 
Walker ex rel. Pizano v. Mart, the same court extended its prior analysis to 
hold that parents may bring wrongful birth claims if they establish that a doc-
tor’s negligence prevented them from choosing to terminate a pregnancy.119 
Based on these cases, Fleming said that he believed that Arizona courts do in-
deed recognize a claim for wrongful birth, and, therefore, the statute prohibit-
ing the cause of action would likely be unconstitutional under the anti-
abrogation clause of the Arizona constitution.120 
Despite Fleming’s misgivings, however, the Rules Committee agreed to a 
motion, stating that the bill was constitutional, and the Senate passed the bill.121 
The bill became law in April of 2012 and Arizona became the tenth state in the 
United States to enact a statute prohibiting the wrongful birth cause of action.122 
III. WRONGFUL BIRTH CLAIMS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO PROCEED 
THROUGH THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
Wrongful birth claims brought by the parents of children who are born 
with undiagnosed disabilities or other health conditions are valuable and nec-
essary methods for parents to recover the medical costs and emotional damage 
of giving birth to a child with a severe disability or terminal disease.123 Addi-
                                                                                                                           
valid. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719; Walker, 790 P.2d at 738, 741; Arizona House of Repre-
sentatives Rules Committee, supra note 114. 
 117 See Univ. of Ariz., 667 P.2d at 1297; Arizona House of Representatives Rules Committee, 
supra note 114. 
 118 Univ. of Ariz., 667 P.2d at 1297; see Arizona House of Representatives Rules Committee, 
supra note 114. 
 119 790 P.2d at 738; see Arizona House of Representatives Rules Committee, supra note 114. 
 120 See ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 6; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719(A); Walker, 790 P.2d at 738; 
Univ. of Ariz., 667 P.2d at 1297; Arizona House of Representatives Rules Committee, supra note 114. 
 121 See Arizona House of Representatives Rules Committee, supra note 114; Senate Approves Bill 
on ‘Wrongful Births,’ supra note 113. Senate Bill 1359 passed the Arizona state Senate 20 to 9. Sen-
ate Approves Bill on ‘Wrongful Births,’ supra note 113. Senator Barto, the sponsor of the bill, ex-
plained that she advocated prohibiting wrongful birth claims because the claims promote the idea that 
someone must be blamed when a child is born with a disability. See id. 
 122 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (2012); Senate Approves Bill on ‘Wrongful Births,’ 
supra note 113 (noting that “[i]f the bill becomes law, Arizona would join nine states barring both 
‘wrongful life’ and ‘wrongful birth’ lawsuits”). 
 123 See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 479 (7th Cir. 1981); Greco v. United States, 893 
P.2d 345, 348–49 (Nev. 1995); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979); ANDREW SOLOMON, 
FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 39–40 (2012); 
Hoberock, supra note 16; Green, supra note 51. 
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tionally, the availability of these claims also ensures that physicians are pres-
sured to provide women with thorough and accurate information about their 
pregnancies.124 State prohibitions on wrongful birth claims are dangerous be-
cause they leave parents with no recourse to recover the extraordinary costs 
and damages of giving birth to and raising a severely disabled child.125 Addi-
tionally, statutes prohibiting wrongful birth claims infringe on the right of 
women to make an informed decision as to whether they will obtain an abor-
tion.126 Because statutes that bar wrongful birth claims deprive parents of the 
opportunity to recover damages and infringe on the rights of women, wrongful 
birth claims should not be prohibited and instead be allowed to proceed 
through the court system.127 
A. The Dangers of Statutes that Prohibit Wrongful Birth Claims 
The current state laws that prohibit wrongful birth claims statutorily pro-
hibit parents from recovering damages under claims in which they allege that, 
but for the negligence of the defendant, they would have exercised their choice 
to terminate a pregnancy.128 Thus, in such cases, the entire emotional and fi-
nancial burden of caring for the child is placed on the parents, even if they 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Berman, 404 A.2d at 14. In finding that the parents of a child born with Down syndrome 
could bring a claim for wrongful birth, the court in Berman v. Allan explained, 
As in all other cases of tortious injury, a physician whose negligence has deprived a 
mother of this opportunity should be required to make amends for the damage which he 
has proximately caused. Any other ruling would in effect immunize from liability those 
in the medical field providing inadequate guidance to persons who would choose to ex-
ercise their constitutional right to abort fetuses which, if born, would suffer from genet-
ic defects. 
404 A.2d at 8–9, 14. 
 125 See Robak, 658 F.2d at 479 (explaining that the birth of the unhealthy child, “and all expenses 
resulting therefrom, were thus the proximate result of defendant’s negligence” in failing to inform the 
plaintiffs of the fetus’s condition); Greco, 893 P.2d at 348–49 (explaining that the birth of an un-
healthy child “is necessarily an unpleasant and aversive event and the cause of inordinate financial 
burden that would not attend the birth of a normal child”); Hoberock, supra note 16 (detailing the 
criticism surrounding the Oklahoma statute). The Robak v. United States court further explained that 
“‘[b]ut for the defendants’ breach of duty to properly treat and advise the plaintiff-parents, they would 
not have been required to undergo the expenditures alleged.’” 658 F.2d at 479 (quoting Speck v. Fi-
negold, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)). 
 126 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 127 See Robak, 658 F.2d at 479; Greco, 893 P.2d at 348–49; Hoberock, supra note 16. 
 128 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 188.130 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (2004). 
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would have exercised their choice not to continue the pregnancy if they had 
known that their child would be born unhealthy or terminally ill.129 
The medical costs of caring for a terminally ill or disabled child can be 
enormous, and many parents initiate wrongful birth suits with the hope that they 
will be able to recover some of those costs in order to better care for their 
child.130 Many of the expenses sought include the costs associated with long-
term care and the treatment of future medical problems during the child’s life-
time.131 In addition to the medical costs of caring for a disabled or sick child, 
many parents of disabled children also face emotional and psychological damage 
stemming from the difficulties of caring and grieving for an ill child.132 Many 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See Robak, 658 F.2d at 479; Greco, 893 P.2d at 348–49. 
 130 See SOLOMON, supra note 123, at 39–40 (highlighting the expenses associated with raising a 
child with disabilities); Andrew Gregory, NHS in £54M Payouts for Not Warning Parents of Disabled 
Babies About Abnormalities at Early Stage, MIRROR (London), Nov. 23, 2012, available at http://www.
thefreelibrary.com/NHS+IN+PS54M+PAYOUTS+FOR+DISABLED+BABIES%3B+Parents+sue+for+
not+being...-a0309660554 (stating that the only option for these parents is to “seek redress in order to 
meet the child’s needs”); Green, supra note 51 (explaining that parents brought a wrongful birth suit for 
the purpose of recovering their daughter’s medical expenses). In his discussion of wrongful birth and 
wrongful life claims, Solomon explained: 
Although wrongful-life cases address an ontological question about what kind of life is 
worth living, this is hardly what prompts them. Being disabled entails colossal expense, 
and most parents who launch wrongful-life suits do so in an attempt to guarantee care 
for their children. In an ugly twist, mothers and fathers must discharge the obligations 
of responsible parenting by stating in legal documents that they wish their child had 
never been born. 
SOLOMON, supra note 123, at 39–40. 
 131 Green, supra note 51 (awarding the parents of a child born with Down syndrome three million 
dollars in damages in a wrongful birth action, meant to “cover the estimated extra lifetime costs of 
caring for their daughter,” including speech and physical therapy and costs to treat possible future 
medical aliments). 
 132 See Rose Steele, Navigating Uncharted Territory: Experiences of Families When a Child Is 
Dying, 21 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 35, 35 (2005), available at 2005 WLNR 6575873; Emily Rapp, Notes 
from a Dragon Mom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, at SR12. Emily Rapp, the mother of a son born with 
Tay-Sachs disease, described the emotional challenges of raising a child with a terminal illness, ex-
plaining that when her son, Ronan, was diagnosed with Tay-Sachs disease after he was born, “it was 
almost as if he died that day.” Rapp, supra; Channeling Dragons to Parent Terminally-Ill Kids, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/17/142466013/channeling-dragons-to-
parent-terminally-ill-kids. Because there is no treatment for Tay-Sachs disease, Ronan will likely die 
before the age of three, after “regressing into a vegetative state,” becoming paralyzed, experiencing 
seizures, and losing all of his senses. Rapp, supra. Although she noted that caring for a terminally ill 
child provides parents with a unique perspective on the fleeting nature of life, she also described the 
inherent frustrations of parenting a child, knowing, “[n]o matter what we do for Ronan . . . he will 
die.” See id. As Rapp put it, the goals of the parents of terminally ill children “are simple and terrible: 
to help our children live with minimal discomfort and maximum dignity. We will not launch our chil-
dren into a bright and promising future, but see them into early graves. We will prepare to lose them 
and then, impossibly, to live on after that gutting loss.” Id. 
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women who had the opportunity to make the informed decision to terminate 
their pregnancy have expressed relief that they received an accurate diagnosis of 
the fetus’s health condition and were able to choose to terminate the pregnancy 
without having to give birth to a child who would be ill and suffer.133 
Further illustrating the emotional and financial costs of parenting a disabled 
child, these parents also reported loss of income and marital problems.134 Fami-
lies caring for children with terminal illnesses report adverse psychological ef-
fects associated with caring for the ill child, mainly that, “[s]trong emotions of 
fear, uncertainty, and grief [that] were always present, but changed in intensity 
over time and gave momentum to the process.”135 Despite these extraordinary 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See Brief for the National Women’s Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent 
at 12–13, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 05-1382) [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae]; 
Rebouché & Rothenberg, supra note 29, at 983–84. Tammy Watts obtained an abortion when her 
doctor and an additional specialist performed prenatal genetic testing and informed her that her child 
would be born with the terminal disease trisomy-13. Brief Amici Curiae, supra, at 12–13. Watts ex-
plained her decision to terminate the pregnancy, saying, 
I had a choice. I could have carried this pregnancy to term, knowing that everything 
was wrong. I could have gone on for 2 more months doing everything that an expectant 
mother does, but knowing my baby was going to die, and would probably suffer a great 
deal before dying. My husband and I would have to endure that knowledge and watch 
that suffering. We could never have survived that, and so we made the choice together, 
my husband and I, to terminate this pregnancy. 
Id. (quoting Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1995) (statement of Tammy Watts)). Similarly, 
Viki Wilson chose to undergo an abortion when she learned that the fetus she was carrying had devel-
oped with severe defects. Id. at 11–12. She and her husband concluded that aborting the pregnancy 
was “a humane solution for the fetus” and they categorized the procedure as their “‘salvation.’” Id. 
(quoting The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 161–62 (1995) (statement of Vicki Wilson)). 
 134 See Steele, supra note 132, at 35. In a study of families of children with progressive, life-
threatening illnesses, the researcher found that the majority of parents studied remained married, yet 
many had marriage problems. Id. In addition, all of the families studied “reported a substantial drop in 
actual or anticipated income due to the child’s illness.” Id. 
 135 Id. The study noted that families experienced “intense” grieving, particularly during the first 
year following the child’s diagnosis. Id. The “many losses” that the families faced after the child’s 
diagnosis added to these feelings of grief: 
[The families] lost their dreams for the child, and whatever they had planned for their 
lives was destroyed. They also lost the children and the family they had expected. Many 
of the [terminal illnesses] were genetic, so parents often chose to have no more children 
once they received the child’s diagnosis. Families accumulated many “smaller” losses 
as well. They watched as the child lost motor and verbal skills, or required increasingly 
complex equipment. Parents had to adjust to each loss. Yet, there was seldom time to 
adjust to one loss before another loss occurred. The magnitude of the distress caused by 
what might seem, on the surface, small or insignificant losses was not apparent to all 
health professionals. 
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medical and emotional costs, parents in states that prohibit wrongful birth claims 
are completely precluded from recovering the costs of giving birth to and raising 
an unhealthy or terminally ill child.136 Had they been given all of the essential 
information about the pregnancy, these parents may have chosen to prevent 
these emotional and financial costs by terminating the pregnancy.137 
In addition to leaving the burden of financial costs solely on parents, stat-
utes prohibiting wrongful birth claims eliminate the essential pressure of mal-
practice lawsuits, which help to ensure that doctors perform their duties to their 
patients.138 Wrongful birth claims are essentially an extension of existing neg-
ligence law, applied to new genetic and prenatal testing technology and the 
fundamental right to obtain an abortion.139 Without this subset of negligence 
claims, doctors are essentially “immunize[d] from liability” even when they 
fail to provide their patients with the thorough and accurate information they 
need in order to make an informed choice about whether or not to terminate 
their pregnancy.140 Wrongful birth claims also ensure the continued availabil-
ity of accurate prenatal and genetic testing.141 There is great value in the exist-
ence of genetic testing and prenatal diagnoses, as these are integral aspects of 
informed family planning and are also the only methods of preventing children 
from being born only to suffer from terminal disease.142 
                                                                                                                           
Id. Additional adverse psychological effects also stem from the uncertainty associated with a terminal 
diagnosis. Id. Despite a terminal diagnosis, “families remained uncertain about how the child would 
respond to medical treatments, the length of time that the child could be expected to live, and how 
their ability to manage would be altered as the child’s disease progressed.” Id. This uncertainty sur-
rounding the illness can result in extreme stress. Id. 
 136 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 188.130 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (2004); 
Robak, 658 F.2d at 479; Greco, 893 P.2d at 348–49. The Robak court found in favor of the plaintiff-
parents, holding that the defendants’ negligence prevented the Robaks from making “an informed 
decision” regarding the continuation of the plaintiff’s pregnancy. 658 F.2d at 476. Furthermore, the 
court noted that as a result of this negligence, the Robaks incurred “large expenses for [their daugh-
ter’s] care and special treatment.” Id. 
 137 See Robak, 658 F.2d at 479; Greco, 893 P.2d at 348–49. 
 138 See Hoberock, supra note 16. 
 139 See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
 140 Robak, 658 F.2d at 476 (quoting Berman, 404 A.2d at 14). 
 141 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 114; Robak, 658 F.2d at 476; Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 343–44 (N.H. 
1986). 
 142 See Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 696 (explaining that “Tay-Sachs disease can be prevented only 
by accurate genetic testing combined with the right of parents to abort afflicted fetuses within appro-
priate time limitations”); Molloy v. Meier, 660 N.W.2d 444, 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining 
that genetic “testing is important because genetic-disease-carrier status and the likelihood of future 
genetic defects are important factors in family-planning decisions”). In Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson 
University Hospital, the court further explained that, “[s]ociety has an interest in ensuring that genetic 
testing is properly performed and interpreted. The failure to properly perform or interpret an amnio-
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The Oklahoma wrongful birth prohibition is particularly worrisome be-
cause it purports to prohibit all medical malpractice claims based on the wrong-
ful birth theory, even in situations where the physician’s misrepresentation of the 
fetus’s condition was intentional.143 As a result, physicians in Oklahoma could 
legally deceive patients about the results of tests, forcing women to rely on inac-
curate information about their pregnancy.144 As the Oklahoma governor noted in 
vetoing the bill, preventing the recovery of damages in wrongful life or birth 
actions “would allow unscrupulous, reckless or negligent physicians to knowing-
ly withhold information or negligently provide inaccurate information to preg-
nant women without facing the potential of legal consequences.”145 
Statutes that prohibit wrongful birth claims also limit the right of women 
to choose to terminate their pregnancies.146 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court 
recognized that women have a constitutional right to choose to end a pregnan-
cy.147 Following Roe, wrongful birth claims increased largely because a suc-
cessful wrongful birth claim requires the plaintiffs to show that, but for the 
negligence of the defendant, they would have exercised their constitutional 
right to terminate the pregnancy.148 When a healthcare provider’s negligence 
results in an incorrect diagnosis of a fetus’s health or the diagnosis information 
is not disclosed, the pregnant woman cannot make a fully informed choice to 
terminate or to continue with the pregnancy.149 
Exploiting the moral and political controversy surrounding abortion, op-
ponents of the wrongful birth cause of action argue that any legal claim that is 
                                                                                                                           
centesis could cause either the abortion of a healthy fetus, or the unwanted birth of a child afflicted 
with Tay-Sachs disease.” Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 696. 
 143 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); Hoberock, supra note 16. 
 144 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); Hoberock, supra note 16. 
 145 See OKLA. S. JOURNAL, 52-49, 2nd Sess. 1454 (2010). Governor Henry further stated, “It is 
unconscionable to grant a physician legal protection to mislead or misinform a pregnant woman in an 
effort to impose his or her personal beliefs on his patient.” Id. 
 146 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 114 (holding that state laws criminalizing abortion “violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, 
including a woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy”); Robak, 658 F.2d at 476. In Robak, 
the defendant argued that the plaintiffs’ wrongful birth claim should be dismissed in part because it 
raised political and moral questions surrounding abortions. 658 F.2d at 476. The court rejected this 
argument, explaining that the “Supreme Court has already settled that issue . . . [when it held in Roe] 
. . . that it was the mother’s constitutional right to decide during the first trimester of pregnancy 
whether to obtain an abortion.” Id. 
 147 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 114. 
 148 Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 409 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); Greco, 893 P.2d at 346; 
Sernovitz v. Dershaw, 57 A.3d 1254, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); see Roe, 410 U.S. at 114; Smith, 513 
A.2d at 345–46 (explaining that advances in genetic testing technology, coupled with the increased 
availability of legal abortions after Roe account for the increase in wrongful birth cases in the late 
twentieth century). 
 149 See Geler, 818 A.2d at 409; Greco, 893 P.2d at 346; Sernovitz, 57 A.3d at 1256. 
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based on abortion rights is an affront to the child’s right to life.150 This argu-
ment was first introduced by the court in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, the seminal 
wrongful birth case.151 The Gleitman court rejected the parents’ wrongful birth 
claim, in part because the “countervailing public policy supporting the pre-
ciousness of human life” outweighed the parents’ wrongful birth claim.152 
As wrongful birth claims increased after Gleitman, opponents also argued 
that the claims could cause individuals to selectively abort undesired fetuses, 
leading to eugenic practices.153 Additionally, proponents of wrongful birth pro-
hibitions contend that recognizing the wrongful birth cause of action “could in-
duce physicians to recommend the abortion of all marginally defective fetuses,” 
perhaps to avoid potential liability in a subsequent wrongful birth action.154 
Despite these moral arguments, Roe established a woman’s constitutional 
right to terminate her pregnancy.155 Therefore, women may seek and physi-
cians should provide any information that would inform a woman’s choice to 
obtain an abortion.156 Prohibiting the wrongful birth cause of action, however, 
permits physicians to withhold information from their patients without legal 
repercussions, thereby threatening the constitutional rights of American wom-
en to choose to terminate their pregnancies.157 
Finally, some argue that state legislatures should be permitted to prohibit 
wrongful birth claims if such claims contradict the state’s public policy against 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See Smith, 513 A.2d at 345; Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967). In Gleit-
man v. Cosgrove, the court further explained that to allow a wrongful birth claim would be to deny 
“the sanctity of the single human life,” and that the child’s right to live exceeded and precluded the 
parents’ right not to endure financial and emotional injury. 227 A.2d at 693. 
 151 See Smith, 513 A.2d at 345; Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 693. 
 152 Smith, 513 A.2d at 345; Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 693. 
 153 See Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 695 (rejecting the defendants’ argument that “recognition of a 
cause of action for damages arising from the denial of an opportunity to obtain an abortion could en-
courage a ‘Fascist-Orwellian societal attitude of genetic purity’”); Gregory, supra note 130; Town-
send, supra note 98, at 1 (citing arguments that wrongful birth suits “severely undermine society’s 
respect for persons with disabilities and promote [eugenics],” the belief that the genetic quality of the 
human race can be selectively improved). 
 154 Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 695. 
 155 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 114 (holding that state laws criminalizing abortion “violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, 
including a woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy”); Robak, 658 F.2d at 476 (stating that 
the issue of a woman’s right to an abortion was settled in Roe and, therefore, applies to wrongful birth 
claims); Smith, 513 A.2d at 343–44 (noting that, “[i]t follows from Roe that the plaintiff . . . may seek, 
and the defendants may provide, information and advice that may affect the exercise of that right” to 
obtain an abortion). 
 156 Smith, 513 A.2d at 343–44. 
 157 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 114; Robak, 658 F.2d at 476; Smith, 513 A.2d at 343–44. 
390 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:365 
abortion.158 Additionally, opponents have argued that these claims should not 
be allowed at common law, as they go against the public policy of the state.159 
In exploring this argument, courts have noted that it is the duty of the state leg-
islature, not the judiciary, to establish these public policies.160 Thus, those op-
ponents of the wrongful birth cause of action argue that any cause of action 
that possibly goes against that state’s public policy should be created by the 
state, rather than by the courts.161 
These arguments fail.162 First, abortion is legal in all states in the United 
States, so there is no existing public policy in any state that runs completely 
against the recognition of abortion rights.163 Second, the wrongful birth cause 
of action simply applies new genetic and prenatal testing technology, along 
with the constitutional right to obtain an abortion, to the existing common law 
negligence cause of action.164 Thus, “[t]he determination of the scope of the 
common law doctrine of negligence is within the province of the judiciary.”165 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 695 (finding that “a cause of action for damages arising from the 
denial of an opportunity to obtain an abortion is contrary to the public policy of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania”); Reed v. Campagnolo (Reed I), 630 A.2d 1145, 1151 (Md. 1993) (explaining that 
although “the public policy of Maryland may foster the development and preservation of the family 
relationship[, it] does not . . . compel the adoption of a per se rule denying recovery by parents of child 
rearing costs from the physician whose negligence has caused their expenditure”) (quoting Jones v. 
Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (Md. 1984)). 
 159 See Reed v. Campagnolo (Reed II), 810 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D. Md. 1993); Gaver v. Harrant, 
557 A.2d 210, 211, 216 (Md. 1989) (declining to recognize a new cause of action for plaintiff-
children’s loss of parental society and affection, in part because the judicial creation of “a new cause 
of action involves serious public policy concerns” and it is typically the function of the Maryland 
legislature to declare the public policy of the state). 
 160 See Reed II, 810 F. Supp. at 170; Gaver, 557 A.2d at 216. 
 161 See Reed II, 810 F. Supp. at 170; Gaver, 557 A.2d at 216. 
 162 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 114 (recognizing that states cannot override “a woman’s qualified right to 
terminate her pregnancy”); Reed II, 810 F. Supp. at 170 (noting that the recognition of the wrongful 
birth cause of action “would not necessarily conflict with any existing public policy defined by the 
[Maryland] Legislature” because “abortion is and was at all relevant times legal in Maryland”); Gild-
iner, 451 F. Supp. at 695–96 (finding a link between a woman’s “constitutionally-protected right to 
obtain an abortion” and society’s “interest in insuring that genetic testing is properly performed and 
interpreted”); Smith, 513 A.2d at 343–44 (concluding that since Roe held that a woman has a “consti-
tutionally secured right to terminate a pregnancy,” a woman “may seek” and her doctors “may pro-
vide, information and advice that may affect the exercise of that right”). 
 163 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 114; Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 695–96; Smith, 513 A.2d at 343–44. 
 164 Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 696. 
 165 Id. 
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B. Wrongful Birth Claims Should Be Permitted to Proceed as  
Common Law Causes of Action 
It is not the role of state legislatures to interfere with parents’ rights by 
prohibiting the wrongful birth cause of action.166 Instead, wrongful birth 
claims should be decided by the judicial system.167 Examples of successful 
wrongful birth claims in states that do allow such claims, as well as the preva-
lence of similar causes of action, demonstrate that states should not prohibit 
wrongful birth claims.168 
Although the policy behind wrongful birth claims is politically and moral-
ly controversial, the essential tenets of the claim are the same as those for med-
ical malpractice, based on the common law negligence cause of action.169 In an 
apt description, some courts have grounded wrongful birth claims in the con-
text of other medical malpractice actions, such as those in which a physician 
fails to diagnose cancer in a patient.170 The court in Greco v. United States ex-
plained, “[e]ven though the physician did not cause the cancer, the physician 
can be held liable for damages resulting from the patient’s decreased oppor-
tunity to fight the cancer, and for the more extensive pain, suffering, and medi-
cal treatment the patient must undergo by reason of the negligent diagnosis.”171 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Smith, 513 A.2d at 343–44 (finding that the right to bring a wrongful birth claim follows 
from the constitutionally-protected right to obtain an abortion); Berman, 404 A.2d at 14 (recognizing 
the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful birth and explaining that to do otherwise “would in effect immunize 
from liability those in the medical field providing inadequate guidance”); Hoberock, supra note 16 
(explaining that the Oklahoma statute may intercede in the doctor-patient relationship). 
 167 See Berman, 404 A.2d at 14 (explaining that “a physician whose negligence has deprived a 
mother of [the opportunity to decide whether her fetus should be aborted] should be required to make 
amends for the damage which he has proximately caused” and that this determination should be made 
in a court of law). 
 168 See Walker ex rel. Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 738 (Ariz. 1990) (recognizing wrongful birth 
as a cause of action in Arizona); Williams v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 688 N.E.2d 130, 132–33 (Ill. 1997) 
(describing similar causes of action, such as wrongful conception and wrongful life, that allow parents 
and children to recover damages for a doctor’s negligence related to prenatal testing and birth); 
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 483 (Wash. 1983) (recognizing wrongful birth as a 
cause of action in Washington); Evans v. Livingston Healthcare, No. DV-11-990B, slip op. at 33–34 
(Mont. 18th J. Dist. Crt. June 18, 2012), available at http://lawyersusaonline.com/wp-files/pdfs-4/
evans-v-livingston-healthcare.pdf (recognizing wrongful birth as a cause of action in Montana). 
 169 See Robak, 658 F.2d at 476 (explaining that a wrongful birth claim “is little different from an 
ordinary medical malpractice action”); Conner v. Stelly, 830 So. 2d 1102, 1107 (La. Ct. App. 2002) 
(characterizing wrongful birth as a medical malpractice claim); Molloy, 660 N.W.2d at 444–45, 450 
(classifying the plaintiffs’ wrongful birth action simply as a medical malpractice action). 
 170 See Conner, 830 So. 2d at 1107; Molloy, 660 N.W.2d at 450; Greco, 893 P.2d at 349. 
 171 Greco, 893 P.2d at 349. The Greco court applied the cancer analogy to a mother’s wrongful 
birth action, explaining, 
[t]he “chance” lost here, was [the plaintiff’s] legally protected right to choose whether 
to abort a severely deformed fetus. If we were to deny [the plaintiff’s] claim, we would, 
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Thus, wrongful birth suits simply extend the existing common law of negli-
gence and the established constitutional right to abortion to apply to scientific 
advances in genetic and prenatal testing.172 Wrongful birth claims should, 
therefore, be allowed to proceed at common law, as failing to do so would 
“leave ‘a void in the area of recovery for medical malpractice’ and dilute the 
standard of professional conduct in the area of family planning.”173 
Wrongful birth claims are also very similar to wrongful conception or 
wrongful pregnancy claims that many states allow at common law, including 
some states that have statutorily prohibited wrongful birth claims.174 A wrong-
ful conception claim is brought by the parents of a child born after a contracep-
tive failure or a negligently performed sterilization procedure.175 The claim is 
brought to recover damages for the expenses of the unwanted pregnancy, and 
parents are typically able to recover damages for the costs of giving birth to 
and caring for the unwanted child.176 
Two Arizona cases that allowed common law claims for wrongful con-
ception and wrongful birth demonstrate the legal similarities between the two 
claims.177 In University of Arizona Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court of 
State in & for Maricopa County, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the state 
would recognize a common law wrongful conception claim and that the plain-
tiff-parents in those cases could recover damages resulting from giving birth to 
and caring for the healthy child.178 The court also explained that wrongful con-
                                                                                                                           
in effect, be groundlessly excepting one type of medical malpractice from negligence 
liability. We see no reason to treat this case any differently from any other medical 
malpractice case. 
Id. 
 172 Evans, No. DV-11-990B at 28–29. 
 173 See Smith, 513 A.2d at 344, 347 (quoting Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003, 1005 (N.H. 
1982)); Berman, 404 A.2d at 14. 
 174 See Walker, 790 P.2d at 738 (holding that Arizona would recognize a common law claim for 
wrongful birth); Williams, 688 N.E.2d at 132–33 (noting that wrongful birth claims are similar to 
wrongful conception claims); Hatter v. Landsberg, 563 A.2d 146, 146, 150 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) 
(holding that plaintiffs were entitled to “recover medical expenses, wage loss, and pain and suffering 
resulting from pregnancy”). Despite legislative attempts to prohibit wrongful birth claims, both Penn-
sylvania and Arizona continue to recognize wrongful conception claims. Univ. of Ariz. Health Sci. 
Ctr. v. Super. Ct. of State In & For Maricopa Cnty., 667 P.2d 1294, 1294 (Ariz. 1983); Landsberg, 
563, A.2d at 146. 
 175 Williams, 688 N.E.2d at 132–33. 
 176 See id.; Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ill. 1983). 
 177 See Walker, 790 P.2d at 738; Univ. of Ariz., 667 P.2d at 1296. 
 178 667 P.2d at 1294, 1300. Patrick and Jeanne Heimann sued Patrick’s doctor after his vasectomy 
operation failed and Jeanne became pregnant with the couple’s fourth child. Id. at 1296. Although the 
child was born healthy, the Heimanns sued for wrongful conception, arguing that because of the doc-
tor’s negligence, they were financially unable to provide for themselves, their three older children and 
the newest child, whose birth was neither planned nor desired. Id. The court held that the plaintiffs 
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ception actions could be decided by a jury and that damages should not be 
treated differently in wrongful conception than in other tort cases.179 Seven 
years later, demonstrating the legal similarities between the two causes of ac-
tion, the Arizona court, in Walker ex rel. Pizano v. Mart, extrapolated from the 
principles established in University of Arizona to determine that the state 
would allow wrongful birth claims at common law.180 The court held, with 
little discussion, that the principles established in University of Arizona re-
quired that the state allow parents to make wrongful birth claims.181 
Although Arizona went on to statutorily prohibit wrongful birth claims, 
the legal similarities between the wrongful birth and wrongful conception 
causes of action show that both can be successfully addressed as common law 
torts.182 While Oklahoma, Arizona, and Pennsylvania all chose to prohibit 
wrongful birth claims together with wrongful life claims, wrongful birth claims 
are actually more similar to wrongful conception claims because they are 
brought by the parents, not the child.183 Additionally, wrongful birth claims are 
even more valuable to parents than wrongful conception claims, as the emo-
tional and medical costs of caring for a disabled or unhealthy child can be 
enormous compared to the costs of raising a healthy child.184 
                                                                                                                           
could bring their wrongful conception action and that the trier of fact should weigh and consider a 
number of financial and nonfinancial factors associated with the birth of the unplanned child, includ-
ing family size, family income, age of the parents, and marital status. Id. at 1294, 1300. 
 179 Id. at 1300–01. The court explained, “[o]ne of the basic principles of damages law is the con-
cept that a wrongdoer may be held liable for all damages which he may have caused and all costs 
which the victim may sustain as a result of the wrong.” Id. at 1300. The court went on to state, “[b]y 
allowing the jury to consider the future costs, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, of rearing and edu-
cating the child, we permit it to consider all the elements of damage on which the parents may present 
evidence.” Id. at 1301. 
 180 See Walker, 790 P.2d at 736–38. In Walker, Laura Walker sued her doctor for wrongful birth 
after he negligently failed to diagnose her with rubella during her pregnancy. Id. at 736–37. Laura’s 
daughter was born with severe birth defects caused by rubella syndrome. Id. But for the doctor’s neg-
ligence, Laura would have terminated her pregnancy. See id. at 737. She sued the doctors, “asserting 
her own claim for ‘wrongful birth,’ and a claim for ‘wrongful life’ on [her daughter’s] behalf.” Id. at 
737. The court dismissed the wrongful life claim, but acknowledged that the parents could bring a 
wrongful birth claim. See id. at 735, 738. 
 181 Id. at 738. 
 182 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (2012); Walker, 790 P.2d at 738; Univ. of Ariz., 667 
P.2d at 1300. 
 183 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719; OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (2010); Williams, 688 N.E.2d at 132–33 (noting that wrongful conception ac-
tions and wrongful birth actions are brought by the parents, while wrongful life actions are asserted on 
behalf of the child). Pennsylvania and Arizona recognize wrongful conception claims. Univ. of Ariz., 
667 P.2d at 1294; Landsberg, 563, A.2d at 146. 
 184 See Williams, 688 N.E.2d at 132 (stating that wrongful conception claims involve a healthy 
child); SOLOMON, supra note 123, at 39–40 (explaining that since “being disabled entails colossal 
expense . . . most parents who launch wrongful-life suits do so in an attempt to guarantee care for their 
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Examples of jury verdicts and settlements from states that do allow 
wrongful birth claims at common law show the enormous value of these 
claims to parents.185 In 2012, a Montana district court judge recognized that a 
couple that gave birth to a child with cystic fibrosis could make a claim that 
their healthcare providers’ negligence deprived them of the opportunity to ter-
minate the pregnancy.186 Notably, however, the court refused to characterize 
the claim as one for wrongful birth, stating instead that the wrongful birth label 
is “misleading and inflammatory.”187 The court instead found that the claim 
was an extension of existing common law principles to the technological ad-
vances of genetic prenatal testing, within the context of the law recognizing a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.188 
In Oregon, Florida, and New York, jury verdicts and settlements in 
wrongful birth claims also allowed parents to successfully recover for the 
enormous emotional and medical costs of raising their children.189 For exam-
                                                                                                                           
children”); Rapp, supra note 132 (recognizing the emotional harm that results from caring for a termi-
nally ill child); Gregory, supra note 130 (highlighting the fact that wrongful birth claims can involve 
children who require extensive care due to their serve disabilities). 
 185 See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 486 (holding that Washington would recognize wrongful birth and 
wrongful life actions); Evans, No. DV-11-990B at 33–34 (holding that Montana would recognize 
common law wrongful birth claims); Green, supra note 51 (discussing a wrongful birth case where the 
parents recovered nearly $3 million); Lohr, supra note 13 (discussing a wrongful birth case where the 
parents recovered $4.5 million). 
 186 Evans, No. DV-11-990B at 3; Pat Murphy, Wrongful Birth Claim Allowed for Child’s Cystic 
Fibrosis, Says Gallatin County District Court, LAWYERS USA (June 25, 2012), available at 2012 
WLNR 13743774. Kerrie and Joe Evans opted to undergo prenatal testing of their fetus, but because 
of a nurse’s paperwork error, they did not discover that their daughter had cystic fibrosis until she was 
born. Evans, No. DV-11-990B at 3–4, 6, 8–9. The Evans sued a group of healthcare providers, includ-
ing the nurse who completed the prenatal testing paperwork, seeking recovery for the medical expens-
es incurred in treating their daughter, as well as “compensation for their ‘mental and emotional dis-
tress,’ ‘loss of consortium,’ ‘impairment of their capacity to pursue an established course of life,’ 
‘medical and psychological care and attention,’ ‘lost wages,’ and ‘lost earning capacity.’” Id. at 10, 
12–13. The defendants argued that Kerrie and Joe’s claim should be dismissed because Montana does 
not recognize wrongful birth claims. See id. at 13; Murphy, supra. 
 187 Evans, No. DV-11-990B at 29 (emphasis removed). 
 188 See id. at 28; Murphy, supra note 186. The court also rejected the defendants’ arguments that 
allowing such claims would “open the door for a wide range of claims by parents who allege (with the 
benefit of hindsight) that they would have aborted their child had they known he or she would suffer 
from a genetic ‘defect.’” Evans, No. DV-11-990B at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court 
contended that such cases will continue to be rare because they require parents to acknowledge their 
“desire for an abortion after the child’s birth.” Id. The court noted that even if such claims were to 
become more prevalent, the Montana constitution guarantees that the state’s courts will be “‘open to 
every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character.” Id. at 19 
(quoting MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 16). 
 189 Green, supra note 51 (describing a nearly $3 million jury verdict stemming from a wrongful 
birth claim in Oregon); Lohr, supra note 13 (detailing a $4.5 million jury verdict in Florida and an 
undisclosed settlement in New York stemming from wrongful birth claims). 
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ple, Sharon Hoffman’s doctor failed to test her for the Tay-Sachs gene, and her 
son was born with the disease.190 Sharon and her husband, who live in New 
York, settled with Sharon’s doctor out of court for an undisclosed amount of 
damages based on the costs of raising their son.191 In Florida, the Santanas 
successfully sued Ana Santana’s physician for failing to perform an ultrasound 
test that would have shown that their son was suffering from severe birth de-
fects.192 The Santanas’ son was born with no arms and one leg.193 At trial, a 
jury awarded the Santanas $4.5 million, which would pay for some of the ex-
penses of raising their son, including prostheses, wheelchairs, operations, at-
tendants, and other healthcare needs.194 Finally, in a recent Oregon wrongful 
birth case, a jury awarded nearly $3 million to Deborah and Ariel Levy for the 
wrongful birth of their daughter, who has Down syndrome.195 The Levys’ at-
torney explained that the couple made the difficult decision to sue for wrongful 
birth because they wanted to recover costs in order to ensure that their daugh-
ter would have the best possible medical care.196 
The success of wrongful birth suits in some states, as well as the existence 
of similar common law torts, demonstrate that the wrongful birth causes of 
action should be handled by the judicial system.197 In spite of this, some states 
have made the decision to prohibit this cause of action, precluding parents 
from recovering the enormous emotional and medical costs of raising their 
children.198 
CONCLUSION 
Wrongful birth claims, brought by the parents of children who are born 
with disabilities or other severe health conditions, are a controversial but valu-
able method wherein parents can recover the extraordinary medical and emo-
                                                                                                                           
 190 Lohr, supra note 13. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Jane Musgrave, Jury Awards West Palm Beach Parents of Child Born with No Arms, One Leg, 
$4.5 million, PALM BEACH POST (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/jury-
awards-west-palm-beach-parents-of-child-born-/nLxqN/. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Green, supra note 51. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 486; Evans, No. DV-11-990B at 33–34; Green, supra note 51. 
 198 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 188.130 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-2 (2004); 
Robak, 658 F.2d at 479 (explaining that the plaintiff-parents’ expenses would not have existed without 
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tional costs of raising their child. These claims are based in part on the recog-
nized constitutional right to abortion and may become more prominent as pre-
natal testing technology further develops. Despite the importance and growing 
prevalence of this cause of action, some states have chosen to prohibit wrong-
ful birth claims, precluding parents from recovering the damages incurred by 
the birth of their child. State prohibitions on wrongful birth claims diminish 
abortion rights and endanger the legal rights of parents to recover costs in a 
medical malpractice action. Instead of prohibiting wrongful birth claims, states 
should allow the claims to proceed at common law, permitting the judicial sys-
tem to decide the merit of each claim. Allowing parents to make wrongful 
birth claims creates a fair and just way of preventing incidences of medical 
negligence and ensuring that these plaintiffs have the opportunity to recover 
the enormous emotional and financial damages that they have incurred due to a 
doctor’s negligence. 
